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The United States, Russia and Great Britain have retired all nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. Surprisingly, China has not. China seems to value highly tactical
nuclear weapons (TNWs). Most studies of China's nuclear arsenal focus on strategic
nuclear weapons. This focus could mislead those trying to understand PRC TNW
strategy. The purpose of this thesis is to explain China's TNW development.
China's nuclear arsenal evolution can be described in three phases. In the first
phase, China developed a limited strategic nuclear deterrent. China's arsenal was
driven by threat. Technology supplanted threat as the dominant driver during the next
phase. While conducting research to miniaturize strategic warheads, TNWs were
developed. During the third phase, a reduced threat caused political leaders to
restrain the nuclear program. The nuclear program reverted to its primary objective
— building strategic weapons, causing TNW production to level off. This study
explains the last two phases ofTNW development.
The research goals are twofold: to compare threat and technology, the primary
motivations driving TNW production; and to examine the relationship between
doctrine and development, describing how one influences the other. The conclusion
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In 1991 the United States, Russia and Great Britain removed all nonstrategic
nuclear weapons from active service. Surprisingly, China did not follow suit.
Tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) seem to be as important to China as ever. Most
studies of China's nuclear arsenal focus on strategic nuclear weapons strategy. This
focus could mislead those attempting to understand PRC TNW strategy. The purpose
of this thesis is to explain TNW development in China through different periods.
B. GOALS
The goals of this research project are twofold. First, this thesis identifies and
compares the primary motivations which drove TNW production — threat and
technology. In this thesis, the dominant motivator is linked with each phase ofTNW
development. Second, this thesis examines the relationship between doctrine and
development, describing how one influences the other during each phase of analysis.
C. HYPOTHESES
This research probes Chinese motivations for developing TNWs. In particular,
this study examines the role of doctrine (driven by threat perceptions) and technology
as influencing factors. This thesis explores an aspect ofPRC strategic planning by
identifying and examining the causal relationship between nuclear doctrine and
arsenal development. Two competing hypotheses are tested to understand TNW
development.
Certain factors influence the development of a nation's nuclear arsenal. The
first hypothesis states that doctrine drives development. Perceptions of external threat
lead political leaders to develop security-based national strategies. Military
strategists develop doctrines of security which support these national security
rx
strategies. The industrial infrastructure builds defense systems following programs
planned by military strategists. According to this classic notion of development,
arsenal design responds to leadership perceptions of threat.
However, this fails to explain the initial building of TNWs. A competing
supposition better explains the emergence ofPRC TNW evolution. It posits that other
means, specifically technology, drove development. The findings of this research
detail which driver is dominant during each phase ofPRC TNW development.
D. FINDINGS
The evolution of China's nuclear arsenal can be described in three phases.
During the early 1960s, China developed strategic nuclear weapons to deter enemies.
China's arsenal was driven by threat. Technology supplanted threat as the dominant
driver during the next phase. While conducting research to miniaturize strategic
warheads, TNWs were developed. During the third phase, political leaders discerned
a reduction in the threat environment. Resources that were allocated liberally to the
nuclear program during the previous phase were reduced. The nuclear program
reverted to its primary objective of building strategic weapons, leaving TNW
production to level off. This thesis studies development during these last two phases
to explain TNW development.
E. IMPLICATIONS
The thesis challenges the notion that security doctrine solely drives weapons
development by exaniining the Chinese nuclear program. This research provides a
case study ofnuclear strategic planning for comparison with the other nuclear powers.
Additionally, this study shows the effects of two competing factors in the
development of China's TNW arsenal. By understanding the operational components
of this medium nuclear power, the strategic planner can forecast more accurately
future Sino-American interaction.
The trend in Chinese force development is an implicit derivative of this
research. The ramifications of the aforementioned research findings are important to
U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, the following recommendations are offered:
1. Continue arms control and disarmament efforts. These could lead to
further reductions in TNW levels. The pressures for reduction in
nuclear arsenals and for prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons
technology to non-nuclear weapon states are growing. It appears that
China feels this pressure and is changing its defense industry.
However, it is likely that China will not be limited by technology
significantly due to the conversion of the defense industry. The
facilities which produce military armaments continue to manufacture
weapon systems; therefore, if the focus returns to nuclear weapons,
TNW systems can be expected to be more advanced than those
currently fielded.
2. Remain Engaged. The emphasis on engaging China politically,
militarily, and economically reduces PRC perceptions of a threat from
the United States. Lower threats, coupled with political stability,
appear to have a mediating effect on TNW production. We can expect
to see fewer weapons due to attrition and low production if this stance
is maintained.
3. Resolve the Taiwan issue. Communicating support, tacitly or
explicitly, for a Taiwanese independence movement could trigger a
return to TNW production. TNWs have great military utility in this
type of skirmish. The PRC considers the use of TNWs on its own
territory not a violation of the "no first use" policy. Additionally, if
this hypothetical independence movement is backed by the United
States, the use of TNWs would be essential to leveling the gap in
technology between these military forces. In the future, enhanced
economic resources and increased technological capability may enable
the PRC to field an advanced TNW arsenal. Therefore, the immediate





The People's Republic of China (PRC) is one of five declared nuclear weapons
states.
1 Today China possesses the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal. 2 Its nuclear
program differs from the other two medium nuclear powers — Great Britain and
France — in both composition of weaponry and overall destructive potential. 3 The
scope of the program is remarkable considering its rocky beginning.
China's nuclear aspirations began as a search for identity and prestige. Despite
economic and resource limitations, China chose to develop a costly nuclear arsenal.
Throughout the Cold War, China's relations with the superpowers changed
dramatically. Consequently, the primary threats to China's security changed. China's
nuclear doctrine developed into an Asian variant of deterrence, which in turn caused
the superpowers to alter their strategies. Several studies have explored the
development of strategic nuclear weapons in China; however, relatively few have
examined Chinese tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs).4 As the Chinese nuclear arsenal
1 The five declared nuclear weapon states are the United States, Russia (former USSR), Great Britain,
France, and China. The term declared nuclear weapon state means that each country manufactured and exploded
a nuclear weapon or other nuclear device before January 1 , 1 967. See the 1 968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
ofNuclear Weapons (NPT), Article DC.
2 Robert Norris, Andrew Burrows, and Richard Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5. British.
French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 8.
3 Great Britain and France structure nuclear arsenals to attack adversaries using long range strikes. To
accomplish this mission, weapons are lighter and the systems are more versatile. China maintains fewer weapons,
but they have high destructive potential. See T. Terrif and I. H. Daalden, "Introduction," Arms Control Today 1 4,
no. 4 (April 1993): 1 -4; and Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook. 8.
4 PRC TNWs are those systems with low ranges and low yields, which are intended to be used within
Chinese territory. The TNW systems examined in this study belong to three groups: bombers, missiles and mines.
Aircraft with tactical roles include the Bu-5, Bu-6, and Qian-5. The M-family of missiles with nuclear capabilities
are M-9/DF-15, M-l 1, and possibly the M-7, and M-18. Atomic demolition mines and enhanced radiation
weapons are the final category. See TNW definition in Chapter II.
1
developed, PRC strategy leaned toward warfighting and away from Western-style
minimum deterrence. 5 This transformation makes the role ofTNWs important.
There are three notable features of the Chinese nuclear program that must be
explained. One puzzling feature of this arsenal, when compared to other states, is
its diverse composition of weaponry. Like Great Britain and France, China has
chosen to incorporate a high percentage of battlefield nuclear weapons into its arsenal
of strategic weapons and delivery systems. 6 More than thirty percent of Chinese
nuclear weapons are tactical. 7 A second notable feature of this arsenal is the
continuity of its tactical component. In September 1991 the United States, Soviet
Union, and Great Britain decided to eliminate TNWs. They removed all non-strategic
weapons from ships and submarines. Despite conducting exercises involving the use
ofTNWs, the Chinese have not officially acknowledged possession of these weapons.
Also, they fail to justify maintaining TNWs when their adversaries have eliminated
these weapons. 8 Finally, Chinese nuclear strategy is uniquely independent. Unlike
the other medium nuclear powers whose nuclear policies are closely linked with those
of the United States, China's nuclear strategy is ardently independent.9
5 China's stockpile ofdeployable systems and warheads exceeds the requirement for rriinimum deterrence
strategy in level (200-250) and variety (a spectrum from strategic to tactical nuclear weapons). The development
ofTNWs runs contrary to the principles ofrninimum deterrence. . . [towards] counter-value, nuclear war-fighting.
J. Mohan Malik, "Chinese Debate on Military Strategy: Trends and Portents," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies
9, no. 2 (Summer 1990), 21-23.
6
Battlefield nuclear weapons and TNWs are used synonymously. Each term is characterized by low
nuclear yields and short ranges. Specific weapon systems are categorized in the next chapter. David Robertson,
Guide to Modem Defense and Strategy (London: Europa Publications, 1987), 37-8.
7
Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook , Table 1
.7, p. 11.
8
J. Mohan Malik, and others believe that the Chinese possess TNWs. It is possible that the Chinese view
non-strategic weapon systems differently than the United States, former Soviet Union and Great Britain. These
differences are explored later. J. Mohan Malik, "China Policy Towards Nuclear Arms Control in the Post Cold
War Era," Contemporary Security Policy, 16, no. 2 (August 1995): 36.
9 France's nuclear strategy was delinked from the NATO alliance in 1 966; however, it was likely that the
French would respond to an Eastern Bloc invasion into Germany with strategic force, as would NATO. The PRC
is not a member of any alliance with nuclear-use connotations.
Why did the Chinese develop their tactical nuclear arsenal in this manner?
This study seeks to explain the unique features of China's nuclear program by
investigating the motives behind the arsenal's development. This thesis analyzes
shifts in the Chinese arsenal development between 1972-79 and 1983-93. See Figure
1-1. Critical turning points in TNW development fall within these periods. The
Chinese arsenal has been under development since 1955, when Mao Zedong stated
the need for an independent nuclear weapon capability. 10 However, the Chinese did
not build TNWs until approximately twenty years later. 11 Less than two decades after
producing roughly 150 TNWs, 12 PRC leaders halted further TNW production. 13
Many factors influence the evolution of China's nuclear weapons program.
I focus only on the two most significant— security and technology. Other factors
also influence the development of a country's national defense. For example, the
organizational process, domestic structures, and national ethos help to design
national security. This study delimits the universe of possible drivers to those factors
which are most important. This restriction of independent variables makes the
research task more practical.
10
This date has been argued by many. The consensus ranges from 1955-58. See Chong-Pin Lin, China's





' Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy , 78-8 1
.
12 The exact size and composition of China's nuclear arsenal is closely held by the PRC. Nevertheless,
several sources have attempted to define the types and size of mis arsenal. Norris predicts that the TNW
component of the PRC arsenal will remain relatively constant for the foreseeable future. See Norris, Nuclear
Weapons Databook. 8.
13 Open source data on the exact cessation ofTNW production is uncertain. See Norris, Nuclear Weapons
Databook. Table 7. 1 , p. 359.




Figure 1.1. Tactical Nuclear Weapon Development
Source: Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Table 7.1, p. 359.
B. PURPOSE
This research project seeks to explain Chinese motivations for developing
TNWs. In particular, this study examines the role of doctrine (driven by threat
perceptions) and technology as influencing factors. This thesis seeks to explain an
aspect ofPRC strategic planning by identifying and examining the causal relationship
between nuclear doctrine and arsenal development. The first hypothesis is a search
for the dominant motivation in programmatic planning.
Certain factors influence the development of a nation's nuclear arsenal. The
common belief is that perceptions of external threat lead political leaders to develop
security-based national strategies. See #S1. Military strategists develop doctrines of
security which support these national security strategies. The military industrial
infrastructure builds defense systems following programs planned by military
strategists. According to this perspective, arsenal design responds to leadership
perceptions of threat.
#S 1 : Threat > Development
This logical progression fails to explain the initial development of TNWs. An
alternative to the threat-driver hypothesis better explains this period of PRC TNW
development. Means other than the desires of the leadership drove development.
This competing supposition posits that technology drove the development. See #S2,
the primary hypothesis of this research.
#S2: Technology > Development
The evolution of China's nuclear arsenal can be divided into three phases.
During the early 1960s, China developed nuclear weapons to satisfy security
requirements. The PRC built strategic nuclear weapons to deter China's enemies.
China's arsenal was driven by threat. Technology supplanted threat as the dominant
driver during the next phase. From the mid 1960s to mid 1970s, research was
conducted to miniaturize strategic warheads and to extend the range of China's
ICBMs. TNWs emerged as byproducts of this research. During the third phase,
political leaders discerned a reduction in the threat environment. These leaders acted
on this reduction of threat. Resources that were allocated to the nuclear program
relatively liberally during the previous phase were redirected. The nuclear program
reverted to its primary objective of building strategic weapons, leaving TNWs
production to level off. This thesis studies development during these last two phases,
and uses the aforementioned hypotheses to explain TNW development.
The second purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between
doctrine and development. According to the threat-driven supposition, doctrine
should be developed prior to the creation of military systems. Conversely, if the
primary hypothesis holds true, then TNW will be developed prior to the development
of doctrine. This thesis tests the two hypotheses to understand the motivations behind
the development ofTNWs in China.
C. RELEVANCE
This study is pertinent to the study of Chinese nuclear development and U.S.
foreign policy. First, the body of academic study on medium nuclear powers is
relatively scarce compared to the treatment afforded the superpowers. Western
scholarly work on China's nuclear strategy and force development is less bountiful,
possibly due to the closed nature of the state, and the primary focus on the former
Soviet Union during the Cold War. As tendency mounts for total nuclear
disarmament, a firm understanding of the rationale behind China's security is
required. 14
Second, sustained economic growth over the past decade has positioned China
to become a strong military power. The course of modernization of China's nuclear
arsenal is very important to the United States. China's increasing power will affect
every regional state and international power. Many states must recompute security
calculations. Several nations must reevaluate alliances and foreign policy. The
ensuing transformation will be important to each state. Therefore, the findings of this
study contribute to a more predictable future of security planning on regional and
international levels.
D. FINDINGS
The thesis challenges the notion that security doctrine drives weapons
development by examining the Chinese nuclear program. This research provides a
case study of strategic and force structure planning for comparison with the other
nuclear powers. Additionally, this study shows the effects of two factors on the
development of China's nuclear arsenal. By understanding the operational
14 Malik, "China Policy Towards Nuclear Arms Control," 1
.
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components of this medium nuclear power, the strategic planner can forecast more
accurately future Sino-American interaction. The results of this research assist
strategists in global and regional planning.
The ramifications of these findings are important to U.S. foreign policy. The
trend in Chinese force development is an implicit derivative of this research. This
study helps to fill an emergent need for further research on the medium nuclear
states. Additionally, this thesis adds to the growing body of academic research into
the nuclear behavior of China.
E. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is organized into six chapters which describe the evolution of
TNWs in China. This introductory chapter provides an overview of the topic. The
following chapter defines terms and discusses the theory used to examine this topic.
The third chapter is a historical review of the early period, in which TNWs are
introduced to the arsenal. The next chapter examines the last decade of TNW
development, tracing trends which lead to the capping of production. The concluding
chapter presents the findings of this study.

H. DEFINITIONS AND THEORY
A. INTRODUCTION
This thesis explains the evolution tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in the
People's Republic of China (PRC) using a technological inertia model discussed later.
This chapter is organized into two themes— definitions and methodology. The first
section discusses the predominant range of approaches to the examination of the
Chinese nuclear arsenal. Every approach provides insight into the development of
nuclear weapons, but each has its limitations. Below, I discuss the strengths and
weaknesses of existing theories, then propose my own. Prior to detailing the
analytical framework, several terms are defined. The last section explains the causal
relationships between the independent and dependent variables.
B. THEORIES AND ANALYSES
Although dwarfed by the volume of attention afforded to superpower nuclear
issues, the scholarly work on China's nuclear arsenal is growing. Several theories are
used to examine the evolution of China's nuclear arsenal. These can be categorized
by their emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons and level of analysis. Each provides
insight to understanding, inter aha, PRC nuclear policy, warfighting doctrine, nuclear
strategy, and arms control stance. Unfortunately, each is limited in its ability to
describe PRC TNW development.
1. The Misguided Focus
Since its entry into the nuclear club, China's growth in military capability has
been impressive. According to Norris, China expanded its arsenal from a single
nuclear device in 1964 to 200 nuclear warheads by 1977. In the following thirteen
years, the arsenal doubled. 15 China has reached milestones of nuclear development
15 Robert Norris, Andrew Burrows, and Richard Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5. British,
French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder: Westview, 1994), Table 7.1, p.359.
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faster than the four earlier nuclear powers, while conducting the fewest number of
tests. For example, the number of months required to advance from the first fission
detonation to the first multistage thermonuclear explosion was thirty-two months. 16
Each of the other nuclear powers took more than twice that amount of time. 17 Most
academic work has focussed on the development of strategic nuclear weapons,
thereby relegating TNWs to "side-topic" treatment. 18 These studies insufficiently
analyze the motivations surrounding TNW development. Instead, TNWs are treated
as supplements to strategic nuclear weapons, thereby enhancing the deterrence
posture— a misleading tendency.
When TNWs are linked closely to strategic nuclear weapons, the purposes
behind the two blend together. The assumption that TNWs exist for the same reasons
as strategic nuclear weapons is not valid until proven. By focusing on the higher
yields, analysts have difficulty explaining whether China's nuclear deterrence posture
is minimum deterrence or limited deterrence with an emphasis on warfighting. 19
Additional problems arise as attention is focussed on a single level of analysis.
16
Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook. Table 1.4, pp.6-7.
17 The periods required for the others are: Great Britain-66, Soviet Union-75, USA-87, and France- 102.
Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook. Table 1 .4, pp. 6-7.
18 For a series of historical analyses of strategic nuclear weapons development in China see John Wilson
Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988); John Wilson
Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1 994); and John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile
Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals," International Security 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 5-40. Other examples
ofthis emphasis are Xue Litai, "Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy," in John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu, eds.,
Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1995); and J. Mohan Malik, "China Policy Towards Nuclear Arms Control in the
Post Cold War Era," Contemporary Security Policy 16, no. 2 (August 1995): 36.
19 For an evolving debate on this issue, see J. Mohan Malik, "Chinese Debate on Military Strategy: Trends
and Portents," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 10-23; and Alastair Iain Johnston,
"China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter
1995/96): 5-42, especially 10-13.
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2. The Constraints of Unit Level Analysis
Many theories of development are used to test propositions in international
relations. The primary theories applied to the development of China's nuclear arsenal
can be separated into two categories: those which examine a single level of analysis,
and those which examine multiple levels. Balance of Power theory and Organization
theory fall into the first group. Socio-Technological theory is in the latter group. The
strengths and weaknesses of these theories are discussed below.
Balance ofPower is a dynamic structural theory which posits that states shift
alliances to maintain an equilibrium of power, and prevent dominance by any single
state.
20 The Sino-Soviet split and subsequent Sino-American rapprochement could
be explained by this approach. The Sino-American coalition formed in the 1970s
could be used to explain technological assistance provided to China in recent
decades. 21 This theory examines interactions of the nation-state on the system level
of analysis. Security doctrine development, international alliance formation, and
supranational regime behavior can be explained using Balance of Power/Threat
theories.22 The constraint of this approach is inherent in its unit of analysis.
By analyzing the highest structural component — the nation-state — the
Balance ofPower theory cannot be used to explain the actions of substate actors, the
strengths and weaknesses of organizations, or the idiosyncracies of political
balance ofPower theory assumes that political leaders will make rational decisions in the best interest
of the country.
21 See James C. Hsiung, "Sino-U.S.-Soviet Relations in a Triadic-Game Perspective," in James C. Hsiung,
ed, Beyond China's Independent Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1985), 107-32; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics
Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1958); Paul Seabury, ed., The Balance of Power, (San Francisco: Chandler,
1965). Stephen Walt argues that states balance or bandwagon against threats. See Stephen Walt, The Origuis of
Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
22 See Gerald Segal, "The Soviet 'Threat' at China's Gates" Conflict Studies no. 143 (London: Institute
for the Study of Conflict, 1983); and Shao-Chuan Leng, China's Nuclear Policy: An Overall View (Baltimore:
University ofMaryland School ofLaw [Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, no. 1,
1984(60)].
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leadership. Undoubtably, adherents to this theory will argue that lower echelons do
not matter when compared to the actions of the state. By narrowing its focus solely
on the state, this theory is limited in explaining TNW development. Conversely, this
theory effectively explains the development of strategic nuclear weapons; for with
these weapons, nations possess the ability to interact militarily and diplomatically
with others.
Organizational theory, as I employ it, is applied to the development of substate
structures and administrations. Organizations are coalitions composed of varied
individuals and interest groups. Each component, harbors enduring differences in
values, preferences, beliefs, information, and perceptions. Occasionally, these
differences change. The most important decisions of organizations involve the
allocation of scarce resources to components. Conflicts arise due to these enduring
differences and scarce resources. Therefore, the ability to influence decisions over
resource allocation is the greatest achievement of an organization. Organizational
theory is applied to the development of China's nuclear arsenal. 23 Unfortunately, this
explanatory method suffers from a singular level of analysis. This approach fails to
capture the phenomena of interest to this study.
Technology inertia model is used for the study of PRC TNWs in this paper.
The strength of this model is that it compensates for the weaknesses of others. This
theory examines the effects of technology throughout the political system by
transcending specific levels during analysis. Technology is shaped by the society in
which it occurs. In turn, that technology shapes the society in which it operates.
Political leaders, bureaucratic units, organizations and ultimately society continuously
23 See Benjamin C. Ostrov, Conquering Resources: The Growth and Decline of the PLA's Science and
Technology Commission for National Defense (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991); John Wilson Lewis and Xue
Litai, China Builds the Bomb ; Nan Li, "Political-Military Changes in China, 1 978-89," Security Studies 4, no. 2
(Winter 1994/95): 426-58; and Chong-Pin Lm, "Chinese Military Modernization: Perceptions, Progress, and
Prospects," Security Studies 3, no. 4 (Summer 1 994): 7 1 8-80.
12
interact with technology. For several reasons, this theory is the best by which to
study the emergence of Chinese TNWs.
First, PRC TNWs were not invented because of security threats from abroad.
In the mid-1970s, the PRC nuclear arsenal could only establish a limited nuclear
deterrence posture based on the possession of strategic nuclear weapons. 24 This
capability satisfied Chinese objectives of "national self-esteem, national autonomy,
security, global influence, regional preeminence, domestic political cohesion, and
domestic economic development."25 The emergence ofTNWs occurred without the
concurrence of the political leadership. These weapon systems do not support threat-
driven security doctrines. The DF-61 tactical ballistic missile is an excellent example.
John W. Lewis and Hua Di contend that the notion of equipping this system with a
nuclear package for People's Liberation Army (PLA) usage did not come from
political leaders.
26 A theory which examines multiple levels of analysis surpasses the
aforementioned theories.
Second, by examining the TNW as a technical component of a system geared
for development of strategic nuclear weapons, this theory enables the analyst to
explain unusual characteristics of PRC nuclear policy. The motivations for
development ofTNWs may not be the same as those for strategic nuclear weapons.
Also, this theory is useful for describing why TNW production has seemingly halted.
Before this theory is discussed, terms are defined which enhance comprehension of
the model and terminology of this field.
24 Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy , 110-112.
25 Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy, 106.
26 See Lewis, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs," 32.
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C. DEFINITIONS
This section defines terms necessary to understand concepts of the theory, and
presents independent and dependent variables.
A strategic nuclear weapon is a weapon system which can strike deep into the
territory of an adversary. These weapons can achieve high yields (greater than
several hundred kilotons), and travel long ranges (greater than 600 km),27 while
carrying significant weight (several hundred kilograms). 28 PRC strategic weapons are
delivered by nuclear missiles,29 bombers,30 and submarines. Some of these systems
can be used in tactical roles, discussed below. Therefore, the definitions which
distinguish between strategic and tactical weapons must involve system
characteristics, and intentions of the user.
Tactical nuclear weapons refer to those systems used within the context of a
battle for direct and immediate tactical ends. These are synonymous with the term
"battlefield nuclear weapons." TNWs are distinguished from strategic nuclear
weapons by yield and range. The lower yield allows use of these weapons without
endangering the user's own troops. The limited range of these weapons constrains
their use to the theater of battle. Examples of weapons in this category are nuclear
shells from field guns with ranges between 15-25 km, atomic demolition mines, and
27
In Chinese military terminology, only missiles with ranges above 1,000 kilotons are considered
strategic. See Lewis, China's Ballistic Missile Programs, 6, note 3.
28Duncan Lennox, ed, Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems (Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 1 996),
unpaginated.
29 The strategic nuclear missiles in the current arsenal are the DF-3/3A, DF-4, DF-5/5A, and DF-2 1 /2 1 A.
The extended range ofthese multistage missiles enables China to reach targets deep into any potential adversary's
territory, including the United States. The DF-4 1 is assumed to be deployed in the first decade of the next century.
This three-stage missile is designated to replace the two-stage DF-5, adding the capability of placing multiple
reentry vehicles on an intercontinental missile. See Lennox, Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, unpaginated.
30 Norris tables 1 70 aircraft that are nuclear capable. These planes can conduct strategic or tactical
strikes. These aircraft have combat ranges from 400 to 3 , 100 km, and are capable of delivering nuclear ordnance
with yields between 10 kt and 3 ML Norris adds that acquisitions of Su-27 bombers could be utilized in a nuclear
role, as well as Iraqi Su-24 Fencers and Mig-29 Fulcrums, held in Iran after the Gulf War. See table and discussion
in Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Table 7. 1 , p. 359, and 365, respectively.
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missiles with ranges of about 100 km. 31 PRC systems which fall into this category
are the "M" family of missiles,32 short range bombers, and atomic demolition mines.
TNW production is the dependent variable in this research.
Technical artifacts are products developed by the large technological system
(LTS). The LTS is described below. These components shape and are shaped by
society. Examples of technical artifacts produced by the LTS are nuclear warheads,
command and control equipment, and submarines.
Grandstrategy is a compilation of broad, enduring interests of a nation-state.
These describe the general direction of the country over many years, even though
specifics of implementation may change frequently. Normally, grand strategies do
not change with the succession of leadership.
The strategic vision is the direction of national endeavor established by
legitimate authority of the government. Usually, strategic vision rests with the
executive branch, and is embodied in the political leader. In the United States,
strategic vision is codified in the national security strategy. Subordinate units develop
strategies, such as the national military strategy, to achieve the objectives of the
national security strategy. Therefore, strategic vision serves as an independent
variable in this analysis.
31 David Robertson, Guide to Modern Defense and Strategy (London: Europa Publications, 1 987), 37-8.
The Chinese view enemy weapons that are used within the boundaries of their territory as strategic weapons, even
though those systems may have been classified by the user as tactical. Interview with senior China analyst, May,
1996.
32 There are four missile types in the M-family,M-7, M-9, M- 11 andM-18. As Duncan Lennox describes
this family, "M-7 is a modified solid propellant SRBM, derived from the old Russian SA-2 'Guideline' SAM
design. The M-9 has a range of600 km, and was adopted during [the] development [phase] by the PLA. The M-
1 1 missile was developed as a solid propellant interchangeable version of the SS-1 'Scud', capable of fitting the
former Soviet MAZ 543 transporter-erector-launcher with rninimum modification. The M-l 1 has a range of 300
km and was also adopted by the PLA. The fourth member of the M-family, M- 1 8, was shown at an exhibition in
Beijing in 1988, and appeared to be a larger two-stage version of the M-9 missile. It has been the basis for what
has been described as a joint Iranian/Chinese programme to develop a 1000 km range solid propellant missile in
Iran where it is known as Tondar-68." The M-9 is slated for export. The internal version, designated DF- 1 5, may
not be nuclear armed. However, its 500 kg payload is capable of delivering a high explosive (i.e. conventional)
or 90 kt nuclear warhead. Lennox, Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems , unpaginated.
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A large technological system (LTS) is defined as a complex of organizations,
the structural system, people, legislative artifacts, and technical components.
Interaction exists between the physical and nonphysical parts of the system during its
evolution. Technological inertia theory examines the influence of the LTS on all
levels of the society. The LTS serves as a facilitating unit for the development of
technical artifacts. The influence generated by the LTS is either enhanced or
suppressed by the independent variables defined in this section.
Apolitical linkage is an authoritative connection between an organization and
upper echelons of the government. An example of an early and important political
linkage is that between Nie Rongzhen and the nuclear industry. Marshal Nie
Rongzhen was head of the Defense Science and Technology Commission, which
oversaw the development of nuclear weapons. Also, as a member of the Politburo,
the Fifteen-Member Special Commission, and as Vice-Chairman of the Central
Military Commission, Nie was able to channel scarce resources into the nuclear
program. Political linkages are independent variables which either enhance or detract
from the inertia of the LTS.
Alliances are another form of independent variable.33 Alliance-building is an
essential tool in the construction of a LTS. Like political linkages, alliances enhance
the influence wielded by the LTS through the cooperation of substate organizations.
Patterns in a web are trends of formation and dissolution of cooperation.
These trends are indicators of momentum in a LTS. Patterns are independent
variables in this research. Variance in the aforementioned variables causes changes
in the intervening variable, the LTS, which in turn causes variation in the dependent
variable. See the causal relationships in Figure 2.1.
33 The definition proposed here should not be confused with state-to-state alliances, such as NATO.
Nevertheless, the principles governing behavior in members of alliances are similar. See Lee G. Bolman and








Figure 2.1. Causal Relationships
D. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGY AND DEVELOPMENT
According to the classical view, development of a warfighting doctrine is
initiated by the leadership after recognizing a threat to national security. The
leadership demands that the military create a doctrine of security which satisfies the
needs of the leadership demands. Then, the defense industrial sector creates weapons
which serve as the armament for that security doctrine. This sector of society draws
upon the technological and economic prowess at its disposal to develop weaponry.
The above information describes a path of arsenal development based on a
threat. This logical progression is generally considered to be the classic method of
development.34 This standard seemed to apply to states with robust defense budgets
such as Cold War superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Matthew
Evangelista explains that the impetus for weapons innovation in the United States
comes from the bottom-up — from scientists. "A new weapon starts with a
technological idea rather than as a response to a specific threat or as a means to fulfill
34 The Joint Doctrine Division, J-7, ofthe Joint Staffdefines strategy as "the art and science of developing,
applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational)
to achieve objectives that contribute to national security." External threats to national security induce states to
develop military capabilities to ensure national security. The operational concept presented here is consistent with
JCS definitions. See JCS Publication 1 -02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 23 March 1994), passim.
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a longstanding mission."35 Conversely, the impetus for technological innovation in
weapon systems was generated from the top-down in the former Soviet Union.36
An alternate development path is the subject of this investigation on China.
Consider a variant ofthe threat-induced arsenal development. Suppose a substantial
threat exists, causing the defense industrial sector to build weapons in support of the
country's security needs. The primary hypothesis of this research is that this
phenomenon occurred in China during the first decade ofTNW development. Since
the Soviet Union was considered an arch enemy, the PRC constructed an arsenal of
large yield ICBMs and strategic aircraft to deter this neighbor from strategic attack. 37
Arsenal construction followed this path for two decades.38 Suddenly, TNWs appeared
in the armory. The actual date ofTNW development was debated for several years
prior to agreement in mainstream Western sources. However, the common consensus
is the mid-1970s.39 Prior to their appearance, military exercises were conducted to
train troops to fight on a battlefield where the opponent used nuclear weapons. 40 The
production of tactical nuclear weapons forced a doctrine to be created for the Chinese
military. The technological inertia model is used to explain these occurrences.
35 Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union
Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1988), x.
30
Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race, x.
37 During this period China's small nuclear arsenal exercised minimum deterrence. The philosophy
behind minimum deterrence is that the adversary is deterred from attack for fear of unacceptable damage from a
nuclear counterstrike.
38 For a detailed discussion of the origins of China's nuclear weapons program, see John W. Lewis and
Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb ; Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962); Leo Yueh-Yun Liu, China as a Nuclear Power in World Politics
(New York: Taplinger Publishing, 1972).
39 Several sources agree on the mid- to late- 1970 deployment date. See Norris, Nuclear Weapons
Databook. 370-1 ; and Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy, 78-80, and 90-2. Alastair Johnston
contends that the actual date is much later based upon a 1 987 General StaffDepartment conference report, which
states that as of the late 1980s, China had no TNWs. See Johnston, "China's Thinking," 35, and note 106.
40 Johnston, "China's Thinking," 33-4; and Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy. 92-4.
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E. METHODOLOGY
The methodological approach used in this research is a historical analysis using
the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) paradigm. 41 The SCOT is an
academic tool used to evaluate alterations in technological systems. Bijker and others
use this paradigm to explore the evolution of technology in social systems. This
model of analysis is illustrative because it is capable of revealing important aspects
in the technical and social components of the technological system under
investigation. Pinch and Bijker describe the attributes of this model as follows:
As we have shown, this model already does more than merely describe
technological development: It highlights its multidirectional character.
Also, as will be indicated, it brings out the interpretive flexibility of
technological artifacts and the role that different closure mechanisms
may play in the stabilization of artifacts. 42
This approach has three main points. First, the system under examination is
heterogeneous. In order for technological artifacts to emerge, the combined efforts
of the technological system must focus on development. This involves gaining
influence over scarce resources. Second, the evolution of artifacts is not contingent
necessarily upon the desires of political authority, but upon the momentum developed
by the system. Third, artifacts are the physical manifestations of the particular
cultural environment. They are shaped by and embody the social and political context
of their origin. The alliances, political linkages and patterns of cooperation among
groups drive the development of these technical artifacts.43
The fact that the evolution of tactical nuclear weapons occurred under a
nuclear program designed for large weapon production makes the Chinese case an
41 Wiebe E. Bijiker, Thomas Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological
Systems (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 17-47.
42
Bijker, Social Construction of Technological Systems. 40.
43
For a discussion on the application of these theorems to non-proliferation, see Steven Flank, "The
Historical Sociology ofNuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 3, no.2 (Winter 1993/94): 259-94, especially 261-2.
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interesting one using this methodology. The examination of nuclear technology is
not new to this field of study. Indeed, some notable systems have been examined.45
The following set of guidelines is used to evaluate the Chinese system.
Steven Flank provides guideposts that are useful in the examination of this case
study using the Social Construction of Technology Theory:46
• Avoid technical superiority or cost-effectiveness as an explanation.
Instead look for why or why not a system becomes superior or cost-
effective.
• Avoid money or other resources as an explanation. Instead look for
why or why not a system has access to those resources. Technology
lacks the support of some crucial constituency. Sufficient resources
reflect authority, consensus, or support.
• Avoid truth or reality as an explanation. Instead, look for why actors
are willing to accept something as truth. The determination of truth is
the social process of convincing others and ourselves. Whether
contested or not, truth claims in complex societies are often mediated
by social position.
• Look for how alliances form, how they shape the system, and who the
allies are. Individual actors or monolithic organizations rarely have the
power to create large technological systems. Instead, a large
technological system (LTS) evolves by combining organizations,
interests, existing artifacts, and other heterogeneous elements. Alliance
building is a key mechanism in the development of an LTS.
• Look for how links in the network are strengthened, and how they
stabilize the system.
44 For a discussion on the military-controlled, nuclear industry see John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China's
Strategic Seapower, 74-78.
45 Donald MacKenzie has studied the development of strategic guidance systems in Inventing Accuracy:
A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990). Steven Flank studied the
proliferation ofnuclear weapons in South Africa and India in "The Historical Sociology ofNuclear Proliferation,"
259-94.
46
Flank, "Historical Sociology ofNuclear Proliferation," 259-94. The following modified precepts draw
heavily upon Flank's work.
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• Look for patterns in the web. Evaluate how certain alliances form or
become more obsolete. Sophisticated technology requires control over
its production and environment, continuity in people and organizations
(preserving tacit knowledge and patterns of authority), and a steady
flow of resources from outside organizations. However, high level
purges, organizational realignment, and a shortage of experienced
engineers may undermine the stability needed to produce sophisticated
artifacts.
• Avoid motives or interests as explanations. Instead, go beyond them
to determine who makes the decisions, and how they are formed.
Recognize the simultaneous and interactive way in which interests
come to be defined. Question linear means-ends explanations ofhow
interests translate into actions or artifacts. This final precept pertains
heavily to the examination of a system to discover future trends given
present clues. In the historical case under examination, it is sometimes
possible to simplify past events and artifacts into a linear progression.
However, it should be noted that the crux of the SCOT is to view the
development of a technological system with a multidirectional lens.
With this guiding framework in place, the SCOT paradigm is used to examine
the development of tactical nuclear weapons in the People's Republic of China.
21
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m. ORIGINS OF CHINA'S TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This thesis argues that the development of China's nuclear arsenal can be
separated into three distinct phases. In the early 1960s, China's drive for the
development of strategic nuclear weapons was inspired by security threats. China
began its quest for a nuclear bomb with Soviet assistance. The abrupt withdrawal of
Soviet expertise forced China to continue its quest alone. Two incidents stimulated
the Chinese to build an indigenous infrastructure for producing nuclear weapons—
the 1956-58 Taiwan Straits crisis and the Sino-Soviet split. 47 Initially, China sought
strategic nuclear weapons systems capable of striking the heart of an adversary's
territory.
48
The second period emerged from efforts to modernize weapon systems
developed in the first period. Approximately a decade after China's 1964 detonation
of its first atomic device, tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) entered the nuclear
arsenal. This period is distinguished from the first by the dominant factor driving
development. Technology, not threat, drives development in this period. The
following pages describe the Chinese effort to develop TNWs. The following chapter
describes the shift back to threat-driven development.
This chapter explains the sources of China's development of a tactical nuclear
arsenal. Did the production of TNWs precede doctrines of usage or did doctrinal
requirements drive the development ofTNWs? IfTNWs entered the arsenal without
47
For detailed analysis of the political decisions to enter the nuclear realm, see John W. Lewis and Xue
Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1 988).
48 Descriptions of strategic threat and strategic nuclear weapons are difficult to define because of
differences in range, delivery, capability and doctrines by the possessors of these systems. See Duncan Lennox,
ed., Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems (Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 1996). These are defined in
Chapter n.
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a prior doctrinal requirement for them, then the appearance of these weapons
probably originated from lower-tier entities of the technological system, such as the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Defense Science and Technology
Commission (DSTC). China expanded its large technological system (LTS) in
response to a perception that its industrial complex was vulnerable to attack.
Expansion was pursued at great cost to the country. 49 The technological system
became self-perpetuating, allowing lower tier entities to decide upon the direction of
future arsenal development. This chapter explains how these entities were emplaced
and empowered to act on the decision to diversify the arsenal and build TNWs.
Second, this chapter explores whether the technology-driver is a more
compelling factor than the threat-driver for the introduction of TNWs. PRC leaders
had a world view which was built in conflict. They perceived adversaries as enemies
to be defeated, rather than opponents with whom to compromise. This outlook forced
leaders to develop strategies which ensured the security and prosperity of the state.
These strategies directed the development of military doctrines which, in turn, are
supported by strategic nuclear ordnance. However, TNWs developed differently.
This chapter argues that the development of TNWs preceded doctrine. 50 The
diversification of the arsenal forced military planners to rethink the battlefield use of
TNWs.
This chapter provides explanations of the change in focus of the technological
system, from solely developing strategic nuclear systems to producing tactical
systems. Throughout this period, social and political linkages are identified which
caused the LTS to propel itself forward. I argue that the momentum developed by the
LTS during this period caused TNWs to be produced. Technology, not threat, drove
49 During the early 1960s, approximately fifty percent of China's GNP was expended on nuclear program
development. See discussion on the "Third Line" later in this chapter.
50 Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution (Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1988), 91-96.
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development. Understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of this system in
society establishes the foundation for the next major shift in tactical nuclear weapon
production, described in the following chapter.
This chapter is organized into three sections which describe historical phases
in the development of this technological system. First, the effects of several phases
of social development on the growth of the technological system are summarized.
Next, Mao's decision to develop strategic nuclear weapons is explained. 51 This is
followed by an explanation of the differences between Mao Zedong, his protege Hua
Guofeng, and Deng Xiaoping. Finally, conclusions are drawn from analysis of this
period of tactical nuclear weapon emergence.
B. FROM MINIMUM DETERRENCE TO MASSIVE DETERRENCE
Research into China's science and technology growth should focus on the
historical influences of society. A 1977 OECD report states:
The development of Chinese science and technology cannot be fully
grasped without extensive reference to the socialist background.
Science is considered a product of a given society, which lends to its
ideological characteristics, even ifthe research performed is universally
valid. 52
Accordingly, the study of the growth of the LTS is started years prior to its
production of TNWs.
1. Status of the Program Inherited by Deng
Mao's dilemma was interesting. He had moved away from one pole of the
loose bipolar system which was developing as the cold war emerged, toward a loose
51 During the early stages of China's independent nuclear program, resource constraint compelled Mao
to choose the development of strategic nuclear weapons, placing TNWs on hold. See Chong-Pin Lin, Chinese
Nuclear Weapons Strategy, 95.
52 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Science and Technology in the
People's Republic of China (Paris: OECD, 1977), 210.
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tripolar system. 53 In order to achieve this goal, the PRC had to develop a capable
nuclear program. Communist China realized that as long as superpowers virtually
'monopolized' the world's nuclear weapons, its objective of becoming a great power
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish. 54 Aiming for this objective,
Mao moved from a close alliance with the Soviet Union to self-reliance. The
following section examines the social, economic, and political transitions which took
place and their effect on the momentum of the LTS.
2. Sino-Soviet Cooperation
Strong historical influences acted on Mao, which led to his particular type of
leadership. His sense of massive resistance was rooted in early Chinese strategic
philosophy, and exercised in battle. Mao emphasized successful social transition
toward communism using the forces of the masses. It was through this mass populace
that Mao defeated the U.S.-backed Nationalist forces during the Chinese civil war.
Mao's vision of unlimited human resources, coupled with limited physical resources,
affected technological development. The LTS was the nuclear program. The growth
of the LTS was hampered by the initial plans and further misdirected by internal
turmoil. Mao's first economic plan promised to produce the financial springboard
from which a large technological system could be launched. The foundation of the
program, which was built with heavy Soviet assistance, was laid out in the 1957 Sino-
Soviet Agreement on New Technology for National Defense.
This Sino-Soviet Agreement provided the technical assistance required for the
Chinese nuclear weapon. Under the New Defense Technical Accord signed in
Moscow and Beijing, the Soviet Union agreed to supply China with a prototype
53 Loose tripolar system refers to the balance of power in east Asia between the United States, the Soviet
Union and China during the Cold War. China had insufficient power projection capability to establish a global
tripolar system.
54 Leo Yueh-YunLiu, China as a Nuclear Power in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1962), 25.
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atomic bomb and related technical data. Also, Moscow agreed to assist in the
construction, training, and operation of a gaseous diffusion plant in Lanzhou to
produce enriched Uranium-235. Soviet assistance to China's nuclear effort deepened
considerably under this agreement. 55
The Sino-Soviet split, discussed later, abruptly ended this arrangement. The
withdrawal of Soviet technical expertise and financial assistance severly hampered
the rapid development of the Chinese LTS. China's economy was damaged further
by national economic plans. These failures further weakened the foundation of the
LTS.
The economic boom promised by the First Five Year Plan (1953-57) failed to
materialize. Therefore, Beijing balanced the economy by transferring money from
profitable sectors to support weaker sectors. Specifically, central planners attempted
to revitalize the industrial sector using surplus from the agricultural sector. Further
improvements were made in the strongest sector by emulating the Soviet plan. The
agricultural sector was streamlined, following this centrally-planned model.
Cooperatives were merged forcibly into communes. However, the economy
continued grow slowly. Mao's response to economic shortfalls was the Great Leap
Forward.
3. The Great Leap Forward
The Great Leap Forward (GLF) was launched to invigorate the economy.
Because progress was based on inaccurate agriculture reports, the GLF appeared
successful. However, actual agricultural reports indicated a more dismal result.
As a result ofmisinformation about labor requirements and hysterically
falsified statistics, it was claimed that agricultural output was being
doubled in one year, and that immense transfers of labor to other
55 See John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1993), 55.
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employments were immediately possible. The result was acute
agricultural shortages.... 56
Mao's political opposition desired change.
There were few critics among the top leaders of the CCP. Those who opposed
implementing this program were purged. Some argued that the transformation from
socialism to communism had occurred too rapidly. People suffered greatly as famine
gripped the land. Mao admitted making a mistake. As the sole individual who openly
questioned Mao, Marshal Peng Dehuai was removed from his post as defense
minister, 57 affecting the growth of the LTS.
The GLF is considered a failure. Techniques practiced led to poor production.
For instance, iron and steel were produced in backyard furnaces using scrap metal. 58
Because adequate temperature could not be maintained, this steel was of poor quality,
and frequently resulted in plastic deformation. In this respect, the GLF was a
technical failure. However, with respect to social technological growth, the GLF was
a partial success because it fostered attitudes conducive to the fusion of technology
with society.
The government was able to maintain control of society despite the presence
of one ofthe strongest elements of revolt— starvation. China's public continued to
support politically the revolutionary government in its efforts to modernize. They
56 Colin Clark, "Economic Development in Communist China," 239.
57 Peng Dehuai was one of ten military officials promoted to the rank ofMarshal in 1 959. Since then,
no one has reached this rank. Marshal Peng negotiated and signed the New Defense Technology Accord
committing Soviet assistance to the development of Chinese strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. As chairman
of the CMC, Peng drove the transition of military doctrine from the concept of "people's war," toward active
defense and mobile offense, thereby challenging Mao's edicts. Lin Biao replaced defense minister Peng in 1 959,
during a restructuring which caused other senior military leaders to move up the ladder of command. Mao's
reorganization provoked personal animosities and caused rival networks to grow. See Lewis, China's Strategic
Seapower. 8, 189, 254, note 2, 3 1 8, note 36; and Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, 1990), 581-82.
58 Robert Worden, Andrea Savada, and Ronald Dolan, eds., China: A Country Study (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 44.
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were willing to endure physical hardship, and political mismanagement to accomplish
national objectives. Societal support is crucial to the development of the LTS,
especially under conditions of limited resources. Yeu-Farn Wang describes the
effects of the aforementioned movements:
Despite the impact of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Great Leap
Forward, China's scientific research and development still managed to
move forward along the line of the Twelve-Year Science and
Technology Plan, though certain priority areas were neglected.
Growing differences with the Soviet Union during this period
contributed to the increasing emphasis on military R&D. Therefore,
notwithstanding the growing tension in relations between the State and
intellectuals, certain political leaders ordered that the core of the
country's scientific manpower should be protected from the disturbance
brought about by political upheavals. This implied that the "red versus
expert" debate had another dimension at the upper stratum of the
research establishment, which was by then engaged in R&D activities
related to national security. 59
As Yeu-Farn Wang explains, critical support for intellectuals was maintained
at the upper echelons of the government. Strong political linkages prevented
irreparable damage to the development of the nuclear program. Additionally, Deng
Xiaoping eliminated "redness" as a standard ofmeasure for scientists soon after Mao
died. International events introduced an equally important dimension in the
development for the large technological system.
4. The Sino-Soviet Split
In the 1950s Soviet money and knowledge was a boon to China's development.
Without the Soviets, China would have spent decades developing such a sophisticated
industrial and administrative infrastructure. The Sino-Soviet split was devastating for
the LTS. As a consequence, this rift delayed the emergence ofTNWs.
59 The LTS was protected from social upheavals. Research and development organizations and scientists
faired more favorably than many other sectors of society. See Yeu-Farn Wang, China's Science and Technology
Policy: 1949-1989 (Aldershot, England: Avebury Ashgate Publishing, 1993), 56.
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The Sino-Soviet split arose, in part, due to differences in Marxist-Leninist
ideology. Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalin outraged Mao. Khrushchev
expressed reservations about the foreign policies of the PRC and attempted to use
Soviet aid to force alterations in China's foreign policy stances. He espoused
peaceful coexistence with capitalists and withheld resources vital to the success of the
Great Leap Forward. Khrushchev refused to reveal the atomic secret to China,
causing Mao to feel betrayed.
Elsewhere, Chinese leadership faced a myriad of regional disasters, including
a right-wing coup in Laos, protests in Tibet, and a crisis in Indonesia. Disagreements
between Mao and Khrushchev on the proper method to handle these situations led to
the Sino-Soviet split. Soviet technical experts were ordered back to the Soviet Union.
Yeu-Farn Wang explains the impact of this withdrawal on the developing
Chinese industrial infrastructure.
For a decade, China's technical dependence on one source had limited
its choice of technologies and oriented its capital goods industries
toward production of Soviet-style machinery and equipment. Once the
Soviets suddenly pulled out, the PRC was left high and dry to manage
projects conceived and executed under Soviet tutelage. Left with only
prototypes, the Chinese had no choice but to reverse engineer them, a
process that took years.... 60
This rift forced China to reorganize itself without external assistance from the
Soviets. Mao directed the LTS to continue working toward nuclear weaponry
without Soviet assistance.
At this point Mao was challenged by three factors: (1) no superpower alliance
with which to contend with the West; (2) a failing economy which was imbalanced
along sectorial lines; and (3) the withdrawal of technical and financial assistance by
the Soviet Union. The objective to achieve great power status remained the national
60 The Sino-Soviet split significantly slowed production of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiltes, and
submarines. However, this rift helped to place the LTS in high regard, building its influence over the direction of
resource allocation. Yeu-Farn Wang, China's S&T. 59.
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goal despite these challenges. Mao drew upon his greatest proven resource, the
revolutionary ardor of the masses. To inspire the leadership, Mao utilized the spirit
of the revolution which had been so successful in his past.
From 1961-1966, the momentum of the LTS was robust. This was a critical
period of nuclear program development because an additional nuclear production
complex was built. As described later in this chapter, 61 scarce resources were
allocated for construction of a third nuclear production line. This eventually led to
the advent of TNWs.
5. The Cultural Revolution
The Great Socialist Cultural Revolution was begun in 1966 by Mao Zedong
as a means ofrevitalizing China's revolutionary zeal. The prelude to this movement
was the debate over Wu Han's accounts of Hai Rui in a sequence of plays which
alluded to the removal of Peng Dehuai from his military post. Peng's replacement,
Lin Biao, allied himself with Mao and focused PLA admiration on the Chairman
through the 1963 publication of Quotations from Chairman Mao. This marked a
trend for closer ties between the military and the civilian leadership. 62
Marshal Peng's replacement was opposed by the heretofore silent critics of
Mao. Two groups reviewed Wu Han's case. The more conservative of the two
groups, the Group ofFive, attempted to quell the tensions by recommending that the
plays be treated as an academic debate instead of a political assault. The more critical
group, whose members Jonathan Spence characterizes as "the radical or
61 See the description ofthe political linkages which led to the control of resources by the nuclear program
under subsections "Material Infrastructure," and "The Third Line" later in this chapter.
62
This unstable pattern persisted throughout this early period. Each shift affected the momentum of the
LTS. Mao continually questioned the civil-military relationship. His idiosyncrasy resulted in many reorganizations
within the military hierarchy. For instance, Lin Biao lifted PLA leaders into increasingly prominent positions in
the party and government. However, after ascending to the second highest military post, Lin Biao was undermined
by Mao. See John King Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 992), 400, and
401-405.
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nonestablishment intellectuals," saw Wu Han's plays and other forms of art and
literature as conspiratorial and diametrically opposed to Mao's thoughts. 63 Public
reaction to these social upheavals affected the LTS development by breaking linkages
with traditional relationships and establishing linkages to the intelligentsia. This
revolution affected the latter connections negatively, then positively.
Radical students, organized and trained as Red Guards, staged demonstrations
and led brutal attacks on the "four olds": old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old
habits. This seemed to defy one of the mainstay relationships—father to son.
However, the youth were a repressed group which yearned for an opportunity to alter
its position in the societal structure. During the mass campaign against intellectuals
and foreigners, those accused of being "bad elements" or "revisionists" were forced
to perform manual labor and were humiliated publicly. High level leaders such as
Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi were removed from their posts. Eventually, these
leaders would become the saviors of the intellectual community and rejuvenate the
LTS.
6. Results and Implications
In the Cultural Revolution, we see important trends for the development and
diversification ofthe LTS. Several effects were: expanded defense industry, strained
civil-rnilitary relations, broken social traditions, and degraded academic institutions.
According to Sydney James, the effects of the Cultural Revolution transcended the
economy, affecting the defense industrial sector despite the efforts of the central
leadership.
The central authorities sought to insulate the defense industry from the
effects ofthe Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, political activity and
factional conflict in the factories caused frequent disorders,
occasionally of a prolonged and serious nature. Disruptions of the
63 Jonathan Spence, Search for Modern China, 602-608. The following summary draws heavily on this
account and that of John King Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
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transportation and communication system led to delays in the delivery
of raw materials, parts, and subassemblies.... A large number of
leading Party and government officials were removed from office, with
a resultant decline in policy initiatives. The curtailment in military
production during the Cultural Revolution was not so severe or lengthy
as during the Leap Forward. By the second half of 1968 the worst
effects of the Cultural Revolution were over, and another period of
growth in defense production had commenced. Production appears to
have risen rapidly in the following years, with output in 1971 being
more than double in 1967. 64
A period ofretrenchment followed the Cultural Revolution, during which Lin
Biao was accused of an attempted coup. Two years after Lin's peak in power, the
government reported that he and his family had died in airplane crash while fleeing
to the Soviet Union. Lin's personal ambitions were questioned by Mao. Common
people were confused by the capability of the CCP to reverse its opinion concerning
who was loyal and who was not.65 Lin Biao's fall from grace exacerbated that
confusion. Mao's credibility suffered in the end. China's political leadership
exhibited distrust of the military forces for several years following the alleged coup.
The resulting political and military shakeups adversely affected military influence in
political circles and the allocation ofresources for research and development. 66 Also,
Deng's purge affected LTS growth.
Deng fled to the southern province of Canton after the power struggle. He
allied with old political connection General Xu Shiyou, who helped reincorporate
Deng into government. In 1977, Deng was rehabilitated and re-appointed vice-
premier in the Politburo and to the Military Affairs Commission. Deng's accession
to these posts were important to LTS development. As head of the powerful Central
64 Sydney James, "The Chinese Defense Burden," in China: A Reassessment of the Economy,
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 463.
65 Sydney James, "The Chinese Defense Burden,"463.
66 Sydney James, "The Chinese Defense Burden," 463.
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Military Commission (CMC), Deng was able to influence directly the progress of the
LTS. Deng's more pragmatic vision for the People's Republic of China led to
organizational alterations which allowed technological freedom of scientists working
in the LTS. To consolidate his power, Deng positioned his supporters in influential
positions and eliminated his opposition. As explained below, these alterations led to
the transition from sole development of heavy nuclear weapons to the integration of
TNWs to the production program.
C. NUCLEAR STRATEGY UNDER MAO
1. Three Choices
Mao's strategy evolved from his perceptions of threat from the superpowers.
By initially not having nuclear weapons, Mao had three options for the direction of
China's foreign policy: total nuclear abdication, nuclear proliferation to all states, or
entry into a limited "nuclear club" by development of nuclear weapons. 67 Liu
contends that these choices are not mutually exclusive; instead, each complements the
other.
68 The overall goal in the early stages was to break the nuclear monopoly of the
superpowers. Each of the aforementioned foreign policy options satisfies that goal.
History records that the third option was pursued. Mao taunted the adversarial
arsenals as "Paper Tigers" while he pursued a plan of rapid acquisition. His
warfighting doctrine rested on the strengths of the populace.
The People's War under modern conditions, promulgated in 1959, lasted until
the late 1970s. Lewis describes the revision of the People's War as:
The revision ofthe concept depended on three assumptions. First, the
military concluded that a future war would be large scale and employ
sophisticated weapons. Second, the war would inevitably escalate,
67 Mao's foreign policy choice was to break the nuclear monopoly enjoyed by the United States and the
Soviet Union. Eventually, this decision led to the extablishment of a limited number of declared nuclear states,
known as the "nuclear club."
68 Leo Yueh-Yun Liu, 26-32. Liu discusses the nuances of this apparent dichotomy of choices in detail.
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making China the main battlefield. Finally, at the beginning of the war,
the enemy would possess superior arms. The war would be prolonged
and costly, but in the end 'the people' would prevail. 69
These assumptions and the revised concept persisted until altered by Deng.
The scope and direction of military development rested solely with Chairman Mao.
Until his death in 1976, defense production fulfilled the requirements set forth by
Mao's conception of the threat to China's national security.
Research projects on ballistic missiles and bombs were integrated under one
command, whose goal was to strengthen China's national defense through the
development of a nuclear arsenal. 70 Consequently, evidence ofTNW development
is scarce during this period. Chong-Pin Lin discusses several key issues concerning
the development of China's tactical nuclear arsenal. He points out that although PRC
leadership was interested in developing these weapons during the infant stages of the
nuclear program, TNWs were on a lower priority than the development of heavy
weapons and their means of delivery. 71 Marshal Nie Rongzhen commanded the
PRC's defense science and technology from 1956 to 1966. In his memoirs, Nie
recalls the early days ofTNW development:
The mere possession of conventional weapons does not guarantee the
security of our nation. Moreover, the conventional weapons we could
produce at the time were far behind, in capabilities and qualities, those
of the technologically advanced countries.... In the modern era we
must develop advanced weaponry including ballistic missiles and the
atom bomb.... In 1956, we founded the Ballistic Missiles Research
Institute.... The Institute consisted of several sub-institutes that carried
69 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization
in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 211-214.
70 Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy, 79.
71 Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy, 78-81
.
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research on not only strategic ballistic missiles but also a variety of
tactical ballistic missiles.... 72
From his post as General Secretary of the CCP, Deng Xioping appointed Nie
to the leading role in the development of China's scientific, military and nuclear
industry. 73
2. Material Infrastructure
Marshal Nie Rongzhen directed the daily operations of the nuclear program.
Nie built the infrastructure ofthe nuclear industry. The sites were selected by Deng.
This combination ofpersonalities and personal power propelled the nuclear LTS into
a place of dominance in the PRC. Originally, one of the leaders in the Long March
(1934-35), Nie became the central figure by virtue of his role as leader of the
organizations developing China's LTS and his decision-making position on key
councils.
As Vice Premier of the State Council in charge of science and
technology, Nie was in a unique position to assure support for the
nuclear weapons and missile programs. He was head of the Scientific
Planning Commission charged in 1956 with implementing a national
twelve year plan for scientific and technological development, which
emphasized nuclear weapons development. In addition to director of
the powerful Defense Science and Technology Commission, he was a
member ofthe Politburo and the Fifteen-Member Special Commission
and was Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Between
1959 and 1965, the restructured and renamed Second Ministry of
Machine Building Industry settled into the dominant bureaucratic role
in implementing the nuclear weapons program. Under the Second
Ministry were some dozen bureaus charged with the various tasks
involved in producing nuclear weapons. 74
72 Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy, 79-80.
73
Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook, 344.
74
Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook. 342-43.
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This nuclear bureaucracy led to the construction of several dozen nuclear sites
for the development of the LTS. Insufficient information is available to determine
which sites led to the development ofTNWs as opposed to other components of the
LTS. However, it is safe to assume that several research and development sites were
involved. These sites range from the facilities tasked with the production of fissile
materials to the test sites which completed operational designs. Many are located in
the Northwest region, an area developed for military testing and reconstitution. An
excellent example of trie influence wielded by the LTS is its ability to develop the
Northwest region under the rubric of the Third Line.
3. The Third Line
The LTS was so powerful and well-connected that it was able to construct a
"Third Line" nuclear industrial infrastructure from 1964 to the late-1970s. 75 This
additional set of facilities is entirely separate from, and is a more modern complete
nuclear fuel cycle than, the Soviet-assisted one which preceded it. Its design was
based on the need to provide a strategic reserve, initially against the United States and
later against the Soviet Union. The sites are located in geographically strategic
positions which make use of topographic features for protection against attack. The
enormous scale of the undertaking is evidence of the connections between this nuclear
LTS and other key parts of the political hierarchy. Norris states that this undertaking
was pursued despite the negative impact it had on the Chinese economy.76
Third Line discussions began during the early 1960s. Lin Biao used this issue
in a speech before the "7,000 cadre conference" in January 1962. 77 The Third Line
75 The term "third front" (saxian) is often translated as "third line," "third corps," or third rank." Barry
Naughton prefers the term "third front" because of its military connotation. See Barry Naughton, "The Third Front:
Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior," The China Quarterly 115 (September 1988): 351-86.
76
Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databoolc 348-49. As noted by Norris, costs of the Third Line are estimated
between 40-53 percent of the Chinese budget during this period.
77 Naughton, "Third Front," 532.
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concept was devised to protect coastal regions to the interior. See Appendix, Figure
3-1. However, in 1964 Mao's motivation for implementing this plan returned as the
United States stepped up operations in Vietnam. Naughton states that this marked the
beginning of the Third Line Plan:
Mao advocated moving existing factories inland, and constructing
railway lines in Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan at maximum speed,
even if this involved tearing up tracks elsewhere to obtain rails. Mao's
proposals were adopted, apparently without dissent, and by the end of
the year, activity in these areas was surging forward with top priority.
This marks the clear beginning of Third Front construction, which was
to dominate Chinese industrialization efforts for the next seven years.
Through 1971, every other economic objective, with the exception of
petroleum exploitation, was subordinate to the completion of the Third
Front.
78
Naughton notes that the Third Line Program was given overwhelming
investment support as a national priority from 1965 to 1971. As such, the program
was characterized by four persuasive traits: "it was large; hastily prepared; military
related; and constructed in a highly dispersed fashion." These characteristics serve
as evidence of the ability of the growing LTS to command the limited resources
available to the Chinese. For instance, this enormous undertaking was costly.
The first phase of the Panzhihua complex... cost 3.74 yuan; the
Chengdu-Kumming railway, 3.3 billion; while the coal mining complex
in Guizhou cost well over one billion yuan. For comparison, total
budgetary capital construction in 1965 and 1966 was 16 and 19 billion
yuan respectively.
These expenditures absorbed large percentages of the national investment. See
Appendix, Figure 3.2.
Due to the closed nature of these facilities, little is known about which
particular sites were used in the development of TNWs. However, Naughton points
to several regions ofmihtary industry. Substantial investments were made in western
; Naughton, "Third Front," 353.
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Hunan and Hubei south of the Yangtze, but few details are available. Strategic
facilities were placed in areas surrounding Hunan, Guizhou,79 and Sichuan. In
Chongqing, rnilitary industry was given priority in 1965 and 1966.
According to the Ministry ofNuclear Industry, 'In order to ameliorate
the strategic distribution of the nuclear industry, we began in 1966 to
construct a nuclear industry rear base area, which began in 1966 to
around 1970.' This may refer to the western Hunan/southwest Hubei
region....
The LTS had grown so powerful, through its connections with political
leadership and its importance to the society, that it was now able to direct resources.
The development of this LTS is analogous to a child rolling a palm-sized show ball
down a slope. Early in the descent, the child (leadership) is able to direct the motion
and speed of the snowball (LTS). Eventually, however, the snowball amasses so
much size and inertia that the child can no longer stop or direct the snowball. The
snowball dictates its own direction. The only way it can continue is to increasingly
gain more mass and momentum. Frequently, chunks of snow will fly off the barreling
mass. Although these unintentional fragments (TNWs, atomic demolition mines,
enhanced radiation weapons) were not mandated specifically by the child, they can
be utilized by the child to create a snowman (a diversified arsenal). Afterwards, this
child must develop a plan (doctrine) to use the snowman. Such is the case with TNWs
during this period.
4. Organization
The organizational role ofthe CMC is to guide the development of the nuclear
arsenal by directing the number and type of weapons to be produced. The CMC
receives input from each component of the armed forces; the People's Liberation
79 Guizhou is one ofthe two vast industrial bases slated for rapid completion for explicit military purposes
during the first phase of the Third Line. See Naughton, "Third Front," 356.
80 Naughton, "Third Front," 360 and passim.
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Army (PLA), the Navy (PLAN); and the Air Force (PLAAF) as to what kinds of
weapons are needed. 81
In the latter stages of Mao's leadership, the CMC established the main
objectives of the LTS. Efforts were focussed on reducing the throw weight of
strategic nuclear weaponry. These efforts were necessary to strike deep targets in the
Soviet Union. Heretofore, the strike capability of the nuclear arsenal was limited in
range due to its emphasis on heavy weaponry, and the defensive capabilities of the
adversary. This new objective indirectly facilitated the introduction ofTNWs.
By striving to reduce the weight of its weapons payload, designers had to delve
into theories of miniaturization. These efforts were accompanied by the companion
objective of diversification. 82 Enhanced radiation weapons were discussed, studied,
and eventually fielded. Nuclear land mines were developed. 83 With these
modernizations came the need to plan for their strategic usage. Chong-Pin Lin
discusses the appearance of articles on nuclear training and nuclear exercises in the
official press of the PLA. 84 These articles appear after the introduction of new
weapons technologies to the arsenal. In an attempt to modernize, the LTS introduced
weaponry for which there was no clear threat-driven need.
D. DENG'S STRATEGIC VISION
1. Post-Mao Period
A transitionary period followed Mao's death. This affected the growth of the
LTS in three areas: financial support, political leadership, and civil-mihtary affairs.
81
Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook, 342.
82 Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy , 88-91
.
83 Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy, 91 . Nuclear (or atomic) demolition mines are a
subset ofTNWs used by PLA ground forces.
84 Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy, 92-94.
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This section discusses the Four Modernizations, Hua Guofeng's brief interlude, and
civil-military tension.
Lin Biao's ambitions to succeed Mao and the buildup of Soviet troops along
the border led to the rethinking of U.S.-China relations in the early 1970s. The need
for resources and the difficulties of following the Marxist path prompted Mao's
attempts to connect with the outside world.
Relations between the United States and the PRC gradually warmed and
culminated with a high level meeting between Mao and Nixon. A joint communique
on the current state ofU.S.-Chinese relations and attitudes toward Taiwan was issued
shortly thereafter. Many deals were signed with the United States, Japan, Britain,
West Germany, and France for imports of advanced technology. These facilitated
advancements to the LTS. Tactical nuclear weapons, as well as other munitions,
improved as a result of these technological sources.
Mao and his supporters launched a campaign which attacked Confucius and
Lin Biao. This was an ideological campaign about the over-Westernization and
abandonment of Marxist values. The CCP sought to restore its prestige and
legitimization.
With the coming death of Mao and the partial opening of China to the West,
questions arose over the direction of China's economy. The more conservative
leaders of the Cultural Revolution, led by Jiang Qing (Mao's third wife), insisted
upon indigenous efforts at national development. Those views were countered by
Chinese planners who desired more dynamic growth available through foreign
technology and enterprise. Among the leaders of the latter group stood Zhou Enlai,
Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping.
A third figure, Hua Goufeng, emerged the intermediary. He gave a speech
concerning what could be learned from Dazhai. Dazhai was forwarded as a
modernization example after which other regions could be modeled. Self-reliance,
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high production levels, and mechanization drove that prosperity. Hua envisioned a
country full of Dazhais pulling China's economy upward. He suggested
modernization in the four areas, thereby, claiming ground already staked out by Zhou
Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.
The Old Guard dies. When the old guard— Premier Zhou, Marshal Zhu De
and Chairman Mao, died in 1976 — a political vacuum formed. Because of an
ensuing power struggle between moderates and radicals, Deng Xiaoping was ousted
from his government and party posts. The compromise candidate, Hua Guofeng, had
ties to both factions. Hua, a Mao protege, became premier.
Under Hua, moderate policies prevailed. He eliminated the radical opposition
by having the Gang of Four arrested and charged with numerous crimes. To
consolidate his position, Hua maneuvered to have himself named to succeed Mao as
party chairman. Hua then concentrated on stabilizing politics and fostering economic
development. To carry out his program, he appointed moderate officials to high
positions.
Hua's personnel changes and moderate policies hindered the rapid production
ofTNWs by the LTS. However, the bulk of the research and development had been
completed by the time of Hua's emergence. Therefore, products began to be delivered
late during his time and early during Deng's tenure.
2. Emergence of Deng
Deng's strategic vision differs from Hua's/Mao's vision in that Deng was more
pragmatic. Deng's consolidation ofpower benefited the evolution of the LTS and the
production ofTNWs because the two were the personal constructs of Deng prior to
his most recent purge before ascending to power. In December 1978, Deng
reintroduced an improved version of the Four Modernizations Program that had its
antecendents in a program originally discussed years earlier. Now, the program
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became associated with Deng. Although the primary focus of this program was
economic, the socio-political ramifications of the reforms impacted the LTS. 85
The method by which Deng acquired sole leadership is an important
transformation for the LTS because this change introduced political linkages
(alliances) to other influential sectors of society. Domestic political changes are
sometimes necessary for technological modernization. According to David
Mussington, indigenous development of human capital is a critical element for
success.
A strong cadre of engineering, scientific, and manufacturing talent is
necessary for rapid defense-industrial development. Strategies used by
developing countries to establish defense-industrial capabilities should
logically include programs for capital development. 86
In this vein, Deng rehabilitated the intelligentsia.
Dreyer records the increase in status of the intelligentsia. See Table 3.1.
In order to enlist the support of intellectuals, the Maoist
characterization ofthem as 'the stinking ninth category' was removed.
Experts were [no longer] to be despised — their advice would be
actively sought out. 87
In this manner, the LTS was able to survive the weaknesses mounted against
it during Hua's brief interlude. Further, the LTS established the required foothold in
the direction of the nation which allowed the LTS to grow. At this point, the LTS
was altered irreversibly in its scope, linkages, organizations, and direction. These
changes were necessary to produce the artifacts of technology, seen as diversification.
85 For a discussion on the impact of the Four Modernizations, see June Teufel Dreyer, China's Political
System: Modernization and Tradition (New York: Paragon House, 1993), 146-47.
86 David Mussington, Arms Unbound: The Globalization ofDefense Production (Cambridge: Center for
Science and International Affairs, 1 994), 49.
87
Dreyer, China's political System. 147.
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Table 3.1. PRC Graduate Study; Engineering Graduates, 1952-87
EDUCATION: GRADUATE LEVEL ENGINEERS













Source: Colin Mackarras and Amanda Yorke, The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Table 10.11, p. 224.
Post Mao-era goals emphasized reduced yield to be achieved by
miinaturization, and diversification of the arsenal. This was achieved through internal
alliance building. The offshoot of TNWs was a byproduct of the diversification.
These weapons were produced prior to the development of a doctrine of usage.
E. ANALYSIS/SUMMARY
Though the Chinese state's commitment to science and technology
development was firmly set from the very beginning — since the 1950s research
institutes had been established in five sectors — the industrial military complex
forced a large proportion of China's scientific manpower to be devoted to defense
R&D, especially the nuclear program, leaving only a limited amount of resources and
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national investments available to civilian science and technology. The impressive
achievements of the nuclear and space program resulted from the allocation of scarce
and critical resources to the project. 88 The best scientists, research facilities and
funding were channeled into the production of high-priority projects, one of which
was the development of TNWs. Thus, Yeu-Farn Wang argues, there was an
immoderate prejudice toward military-related industry and development.
The priority given to those areas, once begun, tended to perpetuate
itself via bureaucratic inertia; factions in the bureaucracy associated
with defense and heavy industry wielded powerful influence and were
able to protect and enhance their share of the budget, and of essential
raw materials. As a result, the defense establishment enjoyed plentiful
allocation of resources and had a strong influence on the general policy
agenda. The military-industrial bias caused serious sectoral imbalance
in China's overall development, and this institutional legacy created
thorny problems for China's reform programs in the 1980s. 89
The focus of this chapter has been to research the role of TNWs in the
evolution of the LTS. The method used was the evaluation of the social and
technological growth of the system. This methodology, formally known as SCOT,
has been extremely revealing in the discovery of how the LTS altered its path to
diversify midstream.
During the interim between the death of Mao Zedong and the rise of Deng
Xiaoping, the LTS not only survived, it thrived. The phenomenon is due to linkages
that were made between the LTS and important sectors of society. On each level of
analysis, the LTS developed critical connections prior to its transformation as Mao's
life waned. It was founded and directed by influential figures from the revolutionary
struggle. The LTS was able to endure several poor economic and social programs
88 Yeu-Fam Wang, China's S&T. 95.
89 Yeu-Fam Wang, China's S&T. 96.
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which could have dismantled the system in a manner that foreign assistance and
intelligentsia were dismantled. The LTS was stronger than these social entities.
When brought under political questioning, the LTS survived by earlier
positioning of influential people in important positions. The organization, led by the
CMC, was the dominant factor in politics during the latter years ofMao and the early
years of Deng. During this period the strategies changed based on the experiences
and differences in personalities of the leadership. The LTS took this opportunity to
transform itself. It began to diversify, introducing TNWs, atomic land mines and
neutron weapons. The effects of this transformation affected the international
community and the mihtary doctrines of the PLA.
Since the international community, especially regional neighbors, reacted
differently to the evolution of the system, the prestige factor could not be seen as the
sole driving factor in the development of the LTS during this period. Threat too, had
been discounted as an exclusive driver for the development ofTNWs during this time,
partially due to the shifting alliances in the international system. The Soviet Union
remained the primary threat to China's security throughout this period. Chinese
leadership had no reason to alter the development of large weaponry. However, since
the introduction of TNWs appeared prior to the development of a mihtary doctrine
for their usage, the compelling reason for the development of these weapons is very
likely the technological driver.
This story ends where another begins. If the start ofTNW development was
driven by technology, then why did the PRC suddenly reduce high production rates
at the end of the cold war? It would seem the technological linkages would grow
more durable. The answer is rooted in threat reduction. Deng's perception of the
importance ofTNWs changed Economic and national security concerns play larger
roles than technological growth. These and other questions will be evaluated in the
next chapter.
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IV. THE CAPPING OF TNW PRODUCTION
A. INTRODUCTION
After building a large technological system (LTS) capable ofproducing several
nuclear warheads annually, the focus of development seemed to shift. Heretofore,
technological influences on development have led to the expansion and diversification
of the nuclear program.90 The Chinese nuclear system was characterized by its ability
to command high percentages of the national resources. Indeed, technical artifacts
were produced for which the PLA was not prepared to exploit fully. 91 Regional
military training was mandated to teach battalion commanders to utilize these modern
weapons effectively.92 As the PLA created the doctrines to effectively employ these
weapons, production rates began to wane. This chapter explains how momentum was
lost in the LTS, causing TNW production to reach its asymptote.
The momentum of the LTS was affected by external and internal changes.
Also, this period was characterized by alterations in the international system which
were difficult to predict. The Cold War ended abruptly. Many states were taken by
surprise at the rapid demise of the Soviet Union. Security calculations had to be
recomputed. China suddenly found that it could no longer drive its modernization
policy by viewing itself as the crucial third leg upon which international stability
during the Cold War rested. Deng Xiaoping realized early that the future of China's
90
This thesis argues that the development of China's nuclear arsenal can be separated into three distinct
phases with the following characteristics. Chapter II discusses the technological driven phase. This chapter
examines changes which caused threat to become the dominant driver for TNW development.
91 TNWs originated in the mid-1970s, as discussed in Chapter m of this study. The earliest exercises
were conducted in the early 1 980s.
92
Training on the use ofTNWs was conducted by many of the military regions. By 1 984, nine of eleven
military regions had participated in exercises involving the offensive and defensive use of TNWs. See Chong-Pin
Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988),
92-94.
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prosperity rested not only with the strength of its military might, but more important,
with the combined power of all of its resources — particularly, the strength of its
economy. This change in strategic vision created internal wedges between the
established sectors of the society, namely the political leaders and the LTS. Political
linkages and internal alliances were weakened and broken. The direction of the LTS
was drawn fully under the control of the nation's leadership.
This chapter completes the description of tactical nuclear weapon development
in China. It explains the reduction of TNW production using the technological
model. The contribution ofTNWs to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) defense
structure is discussed. This chapter also introduces important trends in ongoing major
international treaty negotiations, from the Chinese political perspective on the utility
of TNWs.
This chapter is divided into sections which describe the influences affecting
TNW development. The first section updates the capabilities of the Chinese nuclear
arsenal, with particular emphasis on TNW systems. The next section describes
organizational changes which altered the control of resources. These patterns
weakened the LTS. The following section discusses the difference in perspective
between the PLA and political leadership. The chapter concludes with an analysis of
the technology driver as an explanatory tool for this period ofTNW development.
B. STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE TRIAD
Chinese tactical nuclear capabilities have grown since the mid-1970s. The
capabilities of the nuclear arsenal must be estimated due to limited information
provided by the PRC. Norris estimates that the Chinese nuclear arsenal contains 300
strategic nuclear weapons, complemented by an additional 150 TNWs that are
available, but not deployed. 93 The Chinese have the ability to deliver these nuclear
93 Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook. vol.
5, British. French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 358.
48
weapons via a number of systems categorized as submarines, bombers, and missiles.
Submarines are capable of delivering strategic nuclear weapons only. Bombers and
missiles can deliver strategic or tactical nuclear weapons.
1. Submarines
Submarine-launched weapons are either conventional or strategic nuclear
delivery systems. The conventional ordnance is delivered predominantly by the aging
fleet of diesel-powered submarines. Nuclear missiles can be launched from the two
Xia-class nuclear-powered submarines, or from the Chinese-assembled, Golf-class,
diesel-powered submarine. 94 These North Sea fleet vessels are capable of launching
the two-stage JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The JL-1 is a strategic
nuclear weapon delivery system which is expected to be supplemented or superseded
by the JL-2, which is under development. The JL-2 adds minimum throw weight but
significant range improvement to the JL- 1 by virtue of an additional rocket motor
stage. The JL-2 is expected to enter service in the mid to late- 1990s. 95
2. Aircraft
Similar to the submarine force, the bomber force is capable of delivering
conventional and strategic nuclear weapons. However, unlike the submarine force,
the bomber force also plays a tactical nuclear role. According to Norris, the bomber
leg of China's triad is deployed at regular air bases with routine rotations to
contingency bases. 96 These aircraft units deploy with nuclear armaments from the
94 See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization
in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), passim.
95
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49
central arsenal for tactical use. 97
Nuclear gravity bombs for tactical use are presumed to be deployed
with and under the control of the Air Force; these may be part of the
overall bomb stockpile. 98
However, there is little evidence that these weapons are warehoused by the leaders
in the several military regions. Washington Post columnist Jack Anderson quotes a
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report as saying:
Only one national stockpile site and no regional sites have been
observed in China. Thus, if nuclear weapons for air delivery are
deployed to air bases, they have been effectively hidden.99
These aircraft have combat ranges from 400 to 3, 100 km, and are capable of
delivering nuclear ordnance with yields between 10 kT and 3 Mt. 100 Norris adds that
acquisitions of Su-27 bombers could be utilized in a nuclear role, as well as Iraqi Su-
24 Fencers and Mig-29 Fulcrums, held in Iran after the GulfWar. 101 The missile force
is capable of delivering nuclear weapons at greater ranges and yields; however, these
systems are engineered for strategic and tactical roles.
3. Missiles
Chinese missile forces can deliver conventional and nuclear weapons for
tactical or strategic use. Nuclear warheads yield ranges from tens of kilotons to 5
97
J. Mohan Malik believes that China has 1 10-150 nuclear-capable aircraft: B-5, B-6, and Qian-5-5.
Recent efforts to modernize the PLA(AF) using American and West European technological assistance, have
suffered due to sanctions imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen square massacre. See J. Mohan Malik, "Chinese
Debate on Military Strategy: Trends and Portents," Journal ofNortheast Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (Summer, 1990):
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100 Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Table 1 .7, pg. 11.
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Mt. 102 The strategic nuclear missiles in the current arsenal are the DF-3/3A, DF-4,
DF-5/5A, and DF-21/21A. 103 The extended range of these multistage missiles enables
China to reach targets deep into any potential adversary's territory, including the
United States. The DF-41 is assumed to be deployed in the first decade of the next
century. 104 This three-stage missile is designated to replace the two-stage DF-5,
enabling placement of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on
an intercontinental missile. 105 Additionally, Chinese missile forces have been
diversified with the introduction of a new family of tactical missiles capable of
carrying conventional or nuclear weapons. There are four missile types in the M-
family— M-7, M-9, M-l 1 and M-18. 106 The internal version, designated DF-15, may
not be nuclear armed. However, its 500-kg payload is capable of delivering a
conventional high explosive or 90 kT nuclear warhead. 107
Therefore, the PRC maintains a nuclear triad of submarines, bombers, and
missiles. Two legs of this threesome can be used in tactical roles — aircraft and
missiles. Reportedly, there are additional tactical systems such as: atomic demolition
mines, enhanced radiation weapons and nuclear artillery pieces.
102 Data compilations on the yields of various weapon systems are available in "The Military Balance,"
London, 1990-94; Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 1985-96; et al.
103 The DF- 1 was a liquid oxygen fueled missile which did not have a nuclear role. The DF-2 was retired
in the late 1980s. See Norris, Databook, 362; and Military Balance, 1989-1990 (London: ESS, 1989), 145.
104
Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Table 1 .7, pg. 11. There is an estimate that the DF-4 1 will enter
service in 1997. See the "Offensive Weapons Tables" in Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems
(Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group), unpaginated. According to Holly Porteous, the DF-41 is a mobile,
1 2,000 km missile, which can deliver 500-700 kg warheads with yields of 200-300 kT. See Holly Porteous,
"China's View of Strategic Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Review 8, no. 3 (March, 1 996): 135.
105
Eric Amett sees no sign that Chinese weapon designers made significant progress in 1 994 on the new
guidance systems required to improve accuracy of China's strategic ballistic missiles or to arm them with MIRVs.
See Eric Arnett, "Military Technology: The Case of China," SEPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmaments
and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 359.
106 See descriptions of these nuclear-capable missiles in Chapter D.
107 Lennox, Jane's Weapon Systems, CSS-6, unpaginated.
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According to Chong-Pin Lin, the army, navy and air force may have received
TNWs as early as 1976. In the army, about 400 203mm guns with 5-kT nuclear
warheads and some 700 152mm guns with 1-kT nuclear warheads were distributed
in 90 artillery battalions under 20 field artillery divisions, stationed along the Sino-
Soviet border. An independent hierarchy, attached to the field artillery divisions,
commanded tactical nuclear artillery forces. Various surface-to-air missiles could
carry 1-2-kT warheads. In the navy, 20-kT warheads were available for naval surface
units. Ten kiloton bombs were available for delivery by the air force's F-9 fighter
bomber. 108 Chong-Pin Lin adds that enhanced radiation weapons were considered
strongly. According to Chong-Pin Lin, the evidence is a number of articles published
in scientific journals and several low yield tests. 109 The continued development of
these weapons is of interest to the PLA, discussed later. However, the political
leadership viewed the utility ofthese weapon systems differently. During the 1980s,
Deng's vision for China's development changed due to alterations in the international
system. These changes and their effect on the LTS are discussed next.
C. DENG XIAOPING'S REVISED STRATEGIC VISION
Deng Xiaoping was the most influential figure in the development of China's
nuclear arsenal by virtue of his long leadership over the program, his tenure in
leadership, and the influence of his personality. 110 Deng established political linkages
108 Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy. 88-9.
109
Articles appeared in Kexue Shinian (Scientific Experimentation) and Hejishu (Nuclear Technology).
See Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy. 89. From 1975 to 1993, China conducted 22 tests.
Approximately fourteen are estimated to be less than or equal to twenty kiloton blasts. Fifteen were conducted
underground. Since 1982, all nuclear tests have been conducted underground. See Norris, Nuclear Weapons
Databook, Appendix 3, 42 1
.
110As Communist party General secretary, Deng appointed Nie Rongzhen to head the nuclear program
in 1 956. Two years later, Deng personally approved sites for construction of major weapons facilities. From 1 982-
3, Deng was elected to chair the PRC and CCP CMC, the most powerful decision making bodies concerning
nuclear weapon development. Although retiring from those positions in 1 989, Deng still wields decision making
power concerning program development. See Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook. 344.
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and broke others which affected the momentum of the LTS. Deng's pragmatic
personality came into play when he made decisions which changed the course of
TNW development. These decisions were based upon the changed international
environment, and Deng's modified domestic perspective.
1. International System Changes
Deng Xiaoping' s strategic vision shifted due to the Sino-Soviet warming, and
his intention to move China further into the community of nations. The Sino-Soviet
warming began at the funeral of Konstantin Chernenkyo in 1985. Minister Li Peng
met with Mikhail Gorbachev after this funeral and indicated that there may be room
for closer relations between the two countries. 111 This closing of ties coincided with
a 1984 threat assessment conducted by the CMC. The results of this study indicated
that China would not be in another major war for at least the next 50 years. 112 This
perception ofa reduced threat led Deng to make institutional changes which affected
the PLA and the LTS. Also, Deng's decision to incorporate China into the
community ofnations had adverse effects for the PLA and the momentum developed
for the LTS.
Deng Xiaoping moved China into the mainstream of arms control and
disarmament by joining several important international organizations and arms control
regimes. These actions further reduced China's threat environment. China's entry
into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), NPT, and negotiations for the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), marked a trend for reduced utility of
111 Colin Mackerras and Amanda Yorke, The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 43.
112 Lewis, China's Strategic Seapower. 100.
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TNWs. 113 China's focus on nuclear nonproliferation may have affected factory level
TNW production. Some defense industries converted from nuclear to conventional
weapon production for two reasons— financial and political. First, nuclear weapons
are less profitable than conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons are more costly to
produce and the demand is low. These systems cannot be sold to nonnuclear weapon
states. Therefore, companies manufacturing nuclear weapon systems must deliver
these armaments to one consumer, the PLA. Conversely, conventional weapons are
easier to produce and distribute. Additionally, portions of the profit gained by the
sale of these arms are maintained by the defense construction establishment. This
extra income supplements reduced military expenditure. Nuclear weapons production
is not only financially undesirable. It is also politically unpalatable.
China's participation in arms control and disarmament regimes may have
affected TNW production. CTBT negotiations influence the development of all PRC
nuclear weapons; however, TNWs are affected more. Negotiations on the CTBT are
likely to prevent further modernization ofTNWs due to the zero-yield, nuclear testing
limit. If only a few tests are available, scientists are likely to use these research
opportunities to modernize primary weapon systems— strategic nuclear weapons, not
secondary systems — TNWs. Therefore, CTBT negotiations have made strategic
nuclear weapons relatively more important than TNWs. PLA views differ from the
political leadership on this point. This dichotomy, which affects TNW production,
is explored later in this chapter.
113 China became a member of the IAEA in 1984, acceded to the NPT in 1992, and has observed the
restrictions ofthe MTCR since 1994. Currently, China has been accused of violations of the MTCR due to alleged
transfers ofM-9 missiles to Pakistan. See Leonard Spector, Mark McDonough, and Evan Medeiros, Tracking
Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts. 1 995 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), 49 and
185-6. China has neither signed the 1 963 partial test ban, nor observed the 1 992 moratorium on nuclear testing.
China and France continue to test until the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, expected to be agreed upon in late
1996.
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2. Domestic Prosperity Focus
Deng Xiaoping lowered military modernization as a priority in China. Savings
were transferred to other sectors. 114 Economic progress which will lead China into
the fastest growing region and by some accounts the leading economic power in the
21st Century.
This shift ofresources from military research and development to other sectors
indicates a long-term focus on the economy. Military spending is used for short-term
gains which satisfy the immediate needs and objectives of the government. Few, if
any, of these investments, build capital which serves the long-term needs of the
nation. Therefore, we see a weakness in the ability of the LTS to command resources.
The LTS must shift its production emphasis to its top priority— building strategic
nuclear weapons. 115
Deng Xiaoping made institutional changes which affected the momentum of
the LTS. He eliminated dual posts in the party and the military. No longer could a
high ranking CCP member hold equally high positions in the PLA. This separation
of civilian and military entities had a twofold effect on weakening the LTS. First,
political authorities were not compelled to lobby for resources for the sake of a
program which they headed. Therefore, the pattern of funding which existed under
Marshal Nie Rongzhen was abolished. 116
114 The four modernization areas are: agriculture, industry, science and technology, and military.
Modernization of the armed forces is viewed as a supporting element of the three higher priorities. Amidst
resistance from production ministries, the number ofmajor military research and development projects were cut
from thirty-five to twenty during these reforms. COSTIND, China Today: Defense Science and Technology
(Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 1993), 890-92.
115 Even strategic nuclear weapon production seems to have tapered off due to this transformation. See
Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook, 374, and Table 7.1, p. 359.
116 Jiang Zemin is the first to regain this dual leadership since Hua Guofeng. This may mark a
reestablishment of this dormant political linkage. However, it will not be as powerful until Deng passes.
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Second, this separation lowered the PLA's status in society. The military
focus of decisions was removed. Now there was a clear separation between the
political hierarchy and those who were commanded, the PLA. By lowering the PLA,
the LTS was lowered in stature, for military research and development is directed by
the PLA. A reduction in LTS influence over resources leads to reduction in the
production of TNWs.
D. PLA PERSPECTIVE
The PLA has seen these transformations differently. It appears that the TNWs
are more important to the defense of the Chinese mainland due to the shift in force
structure. Deng's revised strategic vision incorporated a reduction in manpower of
approximately one million men. With this weakening, 117 the PLA requires TNWs
even more so to repel invaders. Alastair Johnston records that TNWs are required to
repel successfully conventional and nuclear invasions. 118
TNWs are useful for fighting high-tech adversaries such as the United States,
Russia, and Japan. The Gulf War and the Falkland Island war were excellent
examples of how superior technology can deliver rapid victory in limited wars.
TNWs may enable a less technologically capable force to level the playing field with
a high-tech foe during combat.
From trends in development, it appears that the PLA has been unable to
convince leadership to adopt its viewpoint on TNWs. This is partially due to Deng's
weakening ofthe PLA voice. Military reorganization and institutional changes have
117 The long-term view ofmilitary reforms is that the PLA was modernizing during this period. However,
the short-term effect of this reduction of manpower is a weakening of the army. Manpower was an essential
component to defending China against invasion. Consequently, the unique capabilities ofTNWs would restore
this loss ofcombat capability to the PLA.
118
Alastair Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking,'" International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter
1995/1996): 28.
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prevented PLA perspectives from dominating opposing views at the highest level of
decision making in the PRC.
E. CONCLUSION
The reduction in threat caused the capping of China's tactical nuclear arsenal.
The changed strategic environment and the refocussing on domestic prosperity caused
Deng Xiaoping to make decisions which weakened the LTS. Once weakened, the
LTS reverted to its primary responsibility — the production of strategic nuclear
weapons. TNWs were held in lower regard by political authority. The military did
not share this viewpoint. They argued that TNWs were more important for combat
due to the downsizing of active forces, and the difference in capabilities between
high-tech forces and the PLA. These disagreements failed to convince political
leaders because the linkages of influence were weakened and broken. This
phenomenon adversely affected the LTS because of its subsidiary role to the PLA.
The momentum of the LTS has slowed tremendously. The decision- making ability
of lower echelons was severed, resulting in a capping ofTNWs in the late 1980s.
The changed strategic environment and the refocussing on domestic prosperity
caused Deng Xiaoping to make decisions which weakened the LTS. Once weakened,
the LTS reverted its efforts to its primary responsibility, the production of strategic
nuclear weapons. TNWs were held in lower regard by political authority. The
military did not share this viewpoint. They argued that TNWs were more important
due to downsizing of active forces, and the difference in capabilities of high-tech
forces and the PLA. These disagreements failed to convince political leaders becasue
the linkages of influence were weakened and broken. This phenonenmon adversely
affected the LTS, because of its subsidiary role to the PLA. The momentum of the
LTS has slowed tremendously. The decision making ability of lower echelons was
severed, resulting in a capping ofTNWs in the late 1980s.
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In summary, the reduction of threat undeimined the technolgy driver. Reduced
resources restricted TNW developemtn despite PLA desres. Clearly, the political





This thesis has traced the development of China's TNW program. It argues
that TNW production can be explained, in part, by technology. The main findings are
presented in this chapter. Next, the implications for U.S. foreign policy are discussed.
Finally, the future ofTNW development is predicted.
MAIN FINDINGS
Hypothesis Period I (1972-79) Period II (1983-93)
TNW Development Driver Technology Reduced Threat
Strategic Planning Bottom Up Top Down
The main findings of this study are summarized in the above matrix. During
the first analysis period ofTNW development, technology drives the introduction of
PRC TNWs. This driver appeared to be dominant with the exception of a short
period. During the 1968-1969 period, Sino-Soviet tension reached an apex. The
threat of a Soviet invasion, using heavy tanks, seemed probable. Nuclear weapons
were considered as an option to defeat Soviet advances. The PLA planned to use
nuclear bombs in rear areas of the Soviet formations. These nuclear attacks would
cause the invading forces to be enveloped by nuclear attack in the rear, and by
conventional forces forward. There is insufficient open-source evidence to conclude
TNWs were developed explicitly due to the Sino-Soviet confrontation. However, as
discussed in Chapter 3, it is plausible that the decision to build TNWs originated at
the research and development level, not at the political leadership level. 119 The
119 The political leadership desired to develop TNWs in the late 1 950's and early 1 960s; however, limited
resources forced leaders to build exclusively strategic weapons for the nuclear arsenal development. The
governmental aspiration for TNWs was not fulfilled. The PRC nuclear strategy evolved around the capabilities
of strategic nuclear weapons, causing the bureaucratic desire for TNWs to become dormant. However, as
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decision to develop TNWs for use on the battlefield was implemented during the
1970s.
During the second period of analysis, technology is no longer the dominant
driver. The reduction of threat perception drove political decisions which led to the
capping ofTNWs. Chinese leaders discerned a more benign environment. Security
requirements eased as threats were reduced. Actions were taken to promote economic
prosperity during this time. Institutional changes were implemented which reduced
the momentum developed by the LTS during the first period. Consequently, the LTS
was unable to command resources effectively. This change caused the momentum
of the LTS to weaken. Therefore, the LTS reverted to its primary role of developing
strategic nuclear weapons, causing TNW production to level off. The political
hierarchy exercised complete control over the nuclear arsenal. The implications of
these changes are discussed next.
B. IMPLICATIONS
Militarily, China appears to require the use of TNWs for defense against an
invasion and to achieve favorable results when battling high-tech adversaries. This
view is not held by the PRC leadership. China seems to be aligning itself with major
international movements. Therefore, the following observations are made with
respect to U.S. foreign policy:
1. Continue arms control and disarmament efforts. These could lead to
further reductions in TNW levels. The pressures for reduction in
nuclear arsenals and for prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons
technology to non-nuclear weapon states are growing. It appears that
China feels this pressure and is changing its defense industry.
However, it is likely that China will not be limited by technology
significantly due to the conversion of the defense industry. The
resources were channeled into the nuclear program, a momentum was developed which resulted in the
diversification of the arsenal. I argue that designers developed TNWs from the technological research into
miniaturization of the strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, the decision to develop TNWs originated from the
scientific level, not the political level. TNWs were developed in the mid 1 970s.
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facilities which produce military armaments continue to manufacture
weapon systems; therefore, if the focus returns to nuclear weapons,
TNW systems can be expected to be more advanced than those
currently fielded.
2. Remain Engaged. The emphasis on engaging China politically,
militarily,
120
and economically reduces PRC perceptions of a threat
from the United States. Lower threats, coupled with political stability,
appear to have a mediating effect on TNW production. We can expect
to see fewer weapons due to attrition and low production if this stance
is maintained.
3. Resolve the Taiwan issue. Communicating support, tacitly or
explicitly, for a Taiwanese independence movement could trigger a
return to TNW production. TNWs have great military utility in this
type of skirmish. The PRC considers the use of TNWs on its own
territory not a violation of the "no first use" policy. Additionally, if
this hypothetical independence movement is backed by the United
States, the use of TNWs would be essential to leveling the gap in
technology between these military forces. In the future, enhanced
economic resources and increased technological capability may enable
the PRC to field an advanced TNW arsenal. Therefore, the immediate
resolution of this issue is necessary.
C. SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME
The development of China's TNWs is not limited significantly by
technological constraints. If the political hierarchy chooses to develop a large TNW
arsenal, material and technical resources will be available. However, military trends
appear to be toward capable conventional systems, employing stable solid propellants,
terminal guidance packages, and improved electronic architecture. Conventional
weapons do not carry the negative political connotations which hamper nuclear
weapons. These systems are less expensive and are easier to modernize.
120 Here military engagement means the contact and exchange of ideas between U.S. armed forces and
the PLA. Examples are: officers attending military academies of the other country; military exercises; and high
ranking military officials visiting military installations in the other country. It does not imply hostile actions.
Currently, this segment of U.S. engagement is comparatively ineffectual to the others mentioned. However,
improvement in this area would balance U.S. efforts at engagement, resulting in a reduced sense of threat between
the two countries.
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Holly Porteous states that PRC strategists are considering arming strategic
missiles with conventional warheads. These weapons could be used to suggest the
possibility of a successful nuclear counterattack to an adversary while avoiding
escalation. 121 The same applies for tactical systems such as the M-9 missile, which
was demonstrated in March 1996. If these exercise missiles carried nuclear weapons,
then the scenario would have been catastrophic for the independence forces and their
allies. Therefore, these conventional armaments may have a political, as well as
rnilitary, role.
Eric Arnett argues that economic reforms will hamper further indigenous
military technological growth. Foreign assistance will not remedy the problem due
to China's poor assimilation practices. 122 As long as threat perceptions are low, and
the central government maintains control over nuclear arsenal development, military
research and development resources will be constrained. These restrictions, coupled
with trends toward conventional deterrence, will stifle TNW production.
121 Holly Porteous, "China's View of Strategic Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Review 8, no. 3 (March,
1 996): 135. This principle also applies to tactical systems which would be more useful in thwarting a U.S.-backed,
independence movement in Taiwan. This distinguished analyst considers the possibility of a nuclear strike on
Taiwan inconsistent with long term PRC goals for this island. Interview with Holly Porteous, April, 1996.
122
Eric Arnett, "Military Technology: The Case of China," in SIPRI Yearbook 1995 (Oxford: Oxford
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